

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 130717
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF:LWALKER:JR:DJW

APPROVED BY SECRETARY

AF - RMMOOSE

S/P - ALAKE S/S-OTGMARTIN

EUR - MR. VINE

LL/AF - NELY

T - MRS. BENSON

NSC - MR. AARON

DOD/ISA - MR. MURRAY

INR - MR. BOWDLER

-----090639 231819Z /75

O 231748Z MAY 78 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE

CINCLANT NORFOLK IMMEDIATE

CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN IMMEDIATE

DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CINCPAC HONOLULU IMMEDIATE

CINCMAC SCOTT AFB IMMEDIATE

JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SAC OFFUTT NEBRASKA IMMEDIATE

REDCOM MCKILL AFB FLORIDA IMMEDIATE

COMJTF7A FORT BRAGG IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, PINR, PINT, CG

SUBJECT: ZAIRE: NEXT STEPS

REFS: (A) BRUSSELS 9852; (B) KINSHASA 5149 (NOTAL)
(C) BRUSSELS 9862

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM REFS (A) AND (B) THAT THE BELGIANS HAVE DECIDED TO KEEP SOME TROOPS AT KAMINA FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD AND FROM OTHER REPORTING BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THUS, FOR THE TIME BEING, THE EFFECTS OF AN IMMEDIATE PULL-OUT OF EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN AT LEAST POSTPONED.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BELGIANS AND THE FRENCH ARE AT LEAST CONSIDERING NEXT STEPS TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY SITUATION. THE BELGIANS ARE GOING OVER THE OPTIONS CITED IN REF (A) AND THE FRENCH MAY OR MAY NOT BE WORKING UP SOME SORT OF AFRICAN FORCE WHICH MIGHT BE INSERTED INTO SHABA. THE BELGIANS HAVE SPECIFICALLY ASKED US WHAT WE THINK OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE AND WHETHER WE WOULD PARTICIPATE. PRESUMABLY, THE FRENCH AND BRITISH HAVE BEEN ASKED THESE SAME QUESTIONS BY THE BELGIANS.

3. ON OUR SIDE, WE ARE ENGAGED IN AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE KATANGAN INVASION ON (A) THE SECURITY SITUATION (B) THE ECONOMY (C) THE INTERNAL POLI-
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TICAL SITUATION AND (D) THE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION. BEFORE WE DETERMINE OUR OWN COURSE OF ACTION WE WANT TO MAKE SURE WE KNOW THE FULL IMPLICATIONS AND THE DEGREE OF COORDINATION WHICH MIGHT EXIST BETWEEN US AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WHAT WE DON'T WANT TO SEE IS A REPLAY OF LAST WEEK WHERE THE FRENCH AND THE BELGIAN WENT THEIR SEPARATE WAYS AND BOTH ASKED US TO CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR OPERATIONS. IN THE SAME VEIN, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO ZAIRIAN REQUESTS FOR AIRLIFTS OR OTHER SUPPORT BEYOND OUR REGULARLY PLANNED PROGRAMS UNTIL WE SEE WHERE WE WANT TO GO.

4. GIVEN THE FOREGOING, PARIS AND BRUSSELS SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING OVERALL POINTS:

. A) WE ARE ENGAGED IN AN URGENT ASSESSMENT OF THE ZAIRIAN SITUATION AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE WESTERN RESPONSES THERETO. THAT ASSESSMENT WILL COVER THE SECURITY, ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. WE HOPE TO HAVE OUR THOUGHTS TOGETHER BY THE END OF THIS WEEK AND WOULD LOOK FORWARD SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO

CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE WITH THE BELGIANS, THE FRENCH AND PERHAPS OTHERS. IN MEANTIME, WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH FRENCH AND BELGIAN VIEWS AS THEY ARE PREPARED TO SHARE WITH US REGARDING THESE POLICY ISSUES.

. B) WE ENCOURAGE THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS TO DO A SIMILAR COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN BY US ON ANY ONE PART OF THE PROBLEM UNTIL WE SEE THE ENTIRE SCENARIO MIGHT LEAD. WE CAN TELL THE BELGIANS NOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE IDEA OF SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL ROLE WITH MAXIMUM AFRICAN PARTICIPATION, STRIKES US AS ONE IDEA WELL WORTH PURSUING--BUT WE CANNOT AGREE TO THIS POLITICALLY COMPLEX PROPOSAL UNTIL WE, AND THE OTHER
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ALLIES, KNOW HOW THESE AND OTHER SHORT TERM ACTIONS WOULD FIT INTO A LONGER TERM STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH ZAIRE'S OVERALL SITUATION.

- C) WE UNDERSTAND THAT FRENCH AND PART OF BELGIAN FORCES WILL REMAIN IN SHABA. IN MEANTIME, WE WOULD HOPE THAT NONE OF US ENGAGE IN UNCOORDINATED ACTION VIS-A-VIS ZAIRE.

D) WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE FRENCH AND BELGIAN VIEWS ON THIS SCENARIO.

5. FOR LONDON: SUGGEST YOU USE FOREGOING TO BRIEF BRITISH ON OUR CURRENT THINKING AND PLANNING AND TO DETERMINE WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING IT WHETHER THEY ARE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN JOINT CONSULTATIONS.

6. FOR KINSHASA: IF BABIA RENEWS HIS REQUEST FOR U.S. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, YOU SHOULD RESPOND THAT WE ARE NOW REVIEWING ON A PRIORITY BASIS THE QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER CONTRIBUTION THE U.S. CAN APPROPRIATELY MAKE TO IMPROVING THE OVERALL SITUATION IN ZAIRE. PENDING THE ACTIONS OF THAT REVIEW, WE PREFER TO MAKE NO COMMITMENTS BEYOND THOSE ALREADY UNDERTAKEN. VANCE

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:KDSCOTT

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O 241845Z MAY 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6742

S E C R E T STATE 130717

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 130717 ACTION PARIS BRUSSELS LONDON
KINSHASA INFO BONN SECDEF, USCINCEUR, CANCLANT, CINCUSAFE,
DIA, CINCPAC, CINCMAC SCOTT AFB, JCS, SAC OFFUTT AFB, REDCOM
MCDILL AFB, COMJTF7A FT BRAGG, USNMR SHAPE MAY 23.

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UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Disposition Reason:
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Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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SAS ID: 2600039
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ZAIRE: NEXT STEPS
TAGS: MOPS, PINR, PINT, CG
To: PARIS BRUSSELS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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